Combating threats of infectious diseases has been increasingly framed as a global shared responsibility for a multi-actor framework, of states, international organisations and nongovernmental actors. However, the outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) has shown that this governance framework has not been able to limit the spread of this virus, despite the normative and legislative changes to global disease control. By unbundling the concept of responsibility, this article will assess how global shared responsibility may have failed due to the fact that accountability does not fall on any one state or stakeholder, highlighting an inherent weakness with the global disease governance regime. As such, this paper concludes that a move towards multiple responsibilities may prove a more effective mechanism for ensuring global health security.
Introduction

"There is no one to take responsibility, absolutely no one, since the beginning of the [EVD] crisis"
claimed a Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) advisor (New York Times: 3/9/2014) summarising the unprecedented scale of the West African outbreak. This paper seeks to question this assumption of responsibility for disease control. It suggests that the framing of a global shared responsibility for disease threats, which has developed in the post-SARS era, is inherently flawed if no one actor is able to be held accountable for any one part of it. This empirical study of EVD offers an alternative re-framing, as multiple accountabilities may prove more fruitful for understanding failures in this health crisis. This paper suggests three sets of actors that contributed to the chaotic response to the global health threat: the E3 states (Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea), the World Health Organisation (WHO) and Western states. As such, instead of relying on a global shared responsibility for disease control, the paper suggests global health should seek a new framework for governance of infectious disease, with more clearly defined responsibilities for individual actors, based on established accountability chains.
The EVD Outbreak
EVD is a relatively rare disease, yet the 2014-5 crisis represents the largest and most complex outbreak on record, witnessing over 28,000 cases and over 11,000 deaths. This amounts to more cases than all previous outbreaks of EVD combined, since its 'discovery' in 1976 1 . These previous outbreaks were successfully controlled through rapid diagnosis; effective treatment of infected individuals; isolation of patients; contact tracing of all potential infections; safe burials and effective community mobilisation. As such, this EVD outbreak is paradoxical: from a public health perspective the pathogen is readily controllable and yet for much of 2014 it was out of control One plausible analysis by Piot suggests a series of delays and an uncoordinated response have created a 'perfect storm' for the outbreak to spread rapidly through the population 3 . One such delay was the time-lag between the episode emerging in rural Guinea in December 2013, and it being reported to the WHO on 22 nd March 2014. Further factors contributing to Piot's perfect storm narrative include; the spread within a dense urban area; highly mobile populations; porous international borders; the pathogen's appearance in a previously uninfected location; the lack of health system capacity; and mistrust within West-African governments 4 . This paper works within this perfect storm narrative, and seeks to suggest a further contributing factor; the failure of global shared responsibility in global disease governance.
Global Shared Responsibility
The framing of an issue is vital to understanding the ensuing response. The outbreaks of SARS (2003), H5N1 (2005) , H1N1 (2009 H1N1 ( ) and MERS (2012 H1N1 ( -2015 highlighted global mutual vulnerabilities to infectious disease, leading to disease being framed as a collective security threat 5 . This collective security suggests that the responsibility for the protection from the threat (of disease) is held collectively rather than by individual members of the community. Such an understanding can be seen through the favouring of a dynamic global disease governance arrangement championing global shared responsibility for disease control. . This paper suggests that the outbreak of EVD highlights the framing of global shared responsibility offers an unclear allocation of responsibility, but where this allocation is present (under IHR) global shared responsibility lacks a clear chain of enforceability and accountability. Major failures of governance normally call for a review of the status quo, and to reconfigure the arrangements to ensure that such crisis does not reoccur. This paper suggests that to provide greater security from the threat of disease, global shared responsibility should be reframed in terms of multiple responsibilities of individual actors.
Multiple Responsibilities
Accountability for one's responsibilities can be understood as the condition of being answerable to someone for one's activities or performance. It is often underpinned by principal agent logic, in that there is a lead actor (principal) to set responsibilities for agents to carry out, and judge whether they . As such, the normative agenda may call for a global shared responsibility, but the empirical reality -as we shall see through analysis of EVD -does not reflect this framing of responsibility, but rather suggests a myriad of differing principal -agent relationships, which need to be recognised and incorporated into global disease governance to improve its efficacy.
Many actors recognise disease as a security threat. However, the way in which they conceive of this security may vary. For example, some may understand the referent object of threat to be the state (national security threat); the population (human security threat); or economic interest (socioeconomic threat)
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. If there is no true common understanding of the ways in which disease constitutes a security threat, then it is probable that conceptions of global shared responsibility to combat the threat are not alike either. Therefore it may be that there is never a clear alignment of what this shared responsibility may entail, and other accountability chains may be prioritised.
Accordingly, what might be seen is that fundamentally, collective responsibility cannot and does not take precedence over the individual interests of actors
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. In the case of EVD, each actor made a rational calculation of their interests in and responsibility for disease control and to whom they feel accountable for this responsibility, such as their electorate, their international donors or economic interest groups rather than prioritising this notion of global shared responsibility.
Moving away from this notion of global shared responsibility, this paper seeks to show that in fact there were multiple responsibilities and accountability relationships present during the outbreak concurrently. This paper suggests that the actions of three key sets of actors can be shown to represent the failure of shared responsibility; E3 states (Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea), the WHO and Western States. This is not an exhaustive list, and several other actors involved in the global disease governance network could equally be placed here. However, these three have been selected as three of the most prominent actors involved in the response, both financially and from a hands on perspective. Furthermore, these three sets of actors appeared during the outbreak to reject the norm of global shared responsibility either in favour of their own domestic priorities (the E3 and Western states), or due to structural and financial limitations (the WHO). It is important to understand why they were unable to uphold the normative ideal of global shared responsibility, and to reflect on their competing priorities and understandings of domestic and international accountability chains in an effort to strengthen the global disease governance framework ahead of future outbreaks.
E3 States
Individual states (at least in democratic political systems) have a clear principal -agent accountability relationship between state functions/elected officials and the electorate. As part of the social contract, states have a responsibility to safeguard and protect the health of their populations, and to take the necessary steps to ensure the health security of their citizens ).
As such, it is not surprising that they do not have a health system able to cope with the extra capacity required to handle a mass epidemic 36 . An outbreak of cholera in 2012 in Guinea and Sierra
Leone demonstrated that the health systems in this region were incapable of handing any sort of health emergency, with the WHO reporting on their website soon after that several health care facilities did not even have running water or electricity.
Several functions of a health system which would be normally required to limit the spread of a communicable disease were not present; there was a severe dearth of qualified health care workers (for example Liberia has 0.1 physicians, 1.7 nurses and midwives and 8 hospital beds for every 10,000 people 37 ); disease surveillance was rudimentary at best (it is estimated that it took 3 months for the Guinean Ministry of Health to become aware of the outbreak in the first instance); and there was little wherewithal for surge capacity resources to respond to such an outbreak. This lack of capacity was compounded by the governments of the affected countries initially being in denial over . This shows an interesting accountability prioritisation at play, in that these states have appeared to prioritise their relationships with western donors, and the responsibilities they feel to them to meet certain governance requirements, rather than the accountability they feel towards their citizens to limit the spread of disease. Africa. Yet, if taking the same principal-agent logic of accountability that was applied to E3 states, these governments understand their responsibility to their population in the same terms, in that they are responsible to their electorate for ensuring that the threat of EVD does not reach their shores, then this is not surprising. By extension, examining the response of Western states to the EVD outbreak, it could be that their involvement shows that their understanding of a global shared responsibility is more aligned to a global shared responsibility for (their own) national health security. There is no coincidence to this, perhaps the self-interested nature of their response further highlights the inadequacies of the shared responsibility discourse championed by the global disease governance regime 57 .
The Western community could further be held responsible for the onslaught of media hysteria surrounding the outbreak. In highlighting the threat of EVD, and framing it as a deadly plague, the media spawned public fear in several Western countries. As such, these states were then required to take what could be seen as placebo measures to reassure their citizens that they were not at risk of EVD, and that the government had a functioning preparedness plan, should it reach their shores.
This included the USA, UK, France and Canada implementing heightened airport screening for potential EVD cases -a biosecurity measure which has been widely criticised by the public health community for its limited efficacy, due to the long incubation period of the pathogen where travellers may not show any symptoms 58 . Ironically had the financing provided for airport screening been used to resource the on-going response in the E3 or to meet their WHO funding commitments, rather than within Western states, this could have had a considerably greater impact. A number of national airline carriers also suspended flights to E3 states in an effort to stop the international spread of the disease (including British Airways, Emirates, Air France), despite UN resolution 2177 asking for states to not impose such travel changes. Although this was at the discretion of each airline, rather than Western states, this action by Western carriers severely restricted the economies of these E3 states further through barriers to international travel and trade. This is in spite of the fact that such measures would do little to limit the spread: as projections suggest that only 2.8 people per month were likely to be infected with EVD and leave the E3 by air 59 . This highlights a further accountability relationship, the accountability that the Western community feels towards its business and economic interests.
The Committee on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights has declared that cooperation in health is not only an obligation of all states, but for all those in a position to assist others . In the case of the EVD outbreak, Western governments could be seen to be shirking their responsibilities in this area by failing to support the strengthening of the E3 health systems. The IHR, although not offering provision for financing to help states meet their core competencies, do strongly encourage states to provide each other with technical cooperation and logistical support to help develop the core competencies sought through the legislative framework. However, as aforementioned, the E3 states suffered from an exhausted and woefully under-resourced health infrastructure, which was barely able to handle endemic diseases in the region, let alone an outbreak of this scale. Although the ultimate responsibility for not developing a functioning disease control mechanism must fall on the E3 states themselves (and the flawed IHR funding and enforceability mechanisms), Western states should also bear some responsibility for their shortfalls in contributing to helping these states meet these requirements, as per the IHR articles 14 and 44. This argument has suggested that, had Western states invested in greater health system strengthening in the E3 countries prior to the outbreak rather than focusing on issues of Western biosecurity, this outbreak may not have become the humanitarian crisis that has been witnessed. This paper does not wish to suggest that actors should go it alone, or that there should be an end to global cooperation for disease control and response. In the interconnected world in which we exist, such action would be unfeasible. With mass travel and transport, it is inevitable that diseases will cross borders, and that the mutual vulnerability to the threat of disease is ever present. As such, multiple actors will need to continue to work together to manage the threat. As an interconnected globe, there is a need to work together to face the spread of infectious disease, and yet individual actors need more tangible individual responsibilities for which they can be held to account. Developing a more coherent responsibility and governance framework will be a difficult challenge. Although this paper cannot provide all of the answers, it seeks to offer three recommendations for consideration in any new approach.
The end of shared responsibility
Learning from other governance frameworks
One recommendation would be to reflect on other global governance arrangements. An assessment of global environmental governance showed that the most successful engagement between actors happens at a more devolved level of activity 68 . Furthermore, reflecting on the Sustainable Development Goals and the Millennium Development Goals, it can be seen that a goal setting approach with effective progress monitoring has raised public and policy support, as well as being a mechanism to channel funds to areas in urgent need 69 . As such, multiple devolved arrangements with clearer tangible goals between actors bilaterally or multilaterally could provide a more fruitful result than broader normative calls for global shared responsibility for improving global health security.
Offering greater financing mechanisms
A key factor in this EVD outbreak and around the IHR more generally has been a lack of financing to implement disease control measures
70
. Western states fundamentally will need to offer greater financing mechanisms to ensure health security. This could be done bilaterally between states or through increased contributions to the WHO, allowing for a strengthened role for the lead global organisation for health. In the case of EVD, it did not appear that the E3 states were fundamentally unwilling to internalise the normative understanding of responsibility for global health security or to improve their domestic disease control capacities, they simply lacked the resources to do so.
Accordingly, one such devolved responsibility relationship could be, based on Articles 14 and 44 of the IHR, for Western states to help build disease control infrastructure in developing states. The EVD crisis has highlighted that improving disease control is very much in the interest of Western states that seek to protect their own populations and economies from the threat of disease, and therefore such a relationship may suit both parties.
Obviously there are a number of issues with such a recommendation that would need to be addressed, notably that it would reinforce unequal power relationships between states.
Furthermore, it would depend on the willingness of Western states to bear the costs accordingly. 
Addressing issues of enforcement
Enforcement is another issue, and one that deserves considerable thought to explore effective mechanisms for ensuring that each actor in the framework takes their responsibilities seriously and meets any designated goals, in whatever formation these may appear. Although this is a recurrent problem in international law, the IHR and normative goals of global disease governance have not proven strong enough to generate global action. One example might be to include independent monitoring of country compliance into the IHR, rather than the status quo of self-assessment
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. An alternative approach could include withholding institutional privileges at the WHO, such as voting rights at the World Health Assembly, for those actors who fail to meet their individual requirements.
Another option would be to move away from conceptualising enforcement, and to consider incentivising states to adhere to their global health responsibilities. This could include a new financing mechanism for disease outbreaks, an insurance scheme or other innovative approaches
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.
Conclusion
The EVD outbreak proves an excellent case study to highlight a concern with the global disease governance landscape in that to imagine a governance framework in which every actor shares in the same collective security and collective responsibility to combat the threat is naïve. Although states and non-state actors have, for the most part, been complicit in constructing a discourse of global shared responsibility for disease control through the IHR and rhetorical changes to policy, each actor conceives of this threat and responsibility differently and has a multiple of different accountability relationships. These in part, may have contributed to the 'perfect storm' of the failed response to the EVD outbreak in West Africa. This paper has suggested that instead of working within a framework where accountability is unable to fall onto any one actor, it is better to re-frame the responsibility for disease control as a series of differentiated responsibilities. Furthermore, the global health landscape should define clearer roles and responsibilities to each actor in the global health mosaic and understand how they can be held to account for them, rather than to continue by championing a global shared responsibility.
This paper does not seek to provide a definitive solution to the weaknesses of global shared responsibility. It has simply endeavoured to show that the framing of responsibility at a global level has itself become a factor in the inadequate response to the EVD outbreak, as there have not been clear lines of accountability between actors, who have thus been able to pass the buck to others for their failures to respond appropriately. As such, this paper has offered a potential new framing of responsibility; that of multiple responsibilities for global disease control, but as there are inherent flaws in these too, further development of notions of responsibility and governance for disease control must be sought in an effort to strengthen global health security.
